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To the Highest Bidder

  • Steven Rodan
  • May 9, 2022
  • 4 min read

By Steve Rodan


When Hitler began to take over Europe in the late 1930s the Zionist leadership discovered a sure-fire way to make money: the sale of British entry certificates to Palestine.


With desperate Jews throughout Central and Eastern Europe looking for refuge, the Jewish Agency jacked up the price of legal entry to Palestine. With British help, the entry certificate began to be sold to the highest bidder. The Zionist criteria for immigration to the Land of Israel was essentially abandoned. By the time World War II erupted, the only requirement was a fortune.


During most of the 1930s, the Zionist leadership reserved the increasing valuable entry certificate to selected members of the movement. In late 1935, the Jewish Agency’s Aliya Commission recommended taxes and additional restrictions on those unaffiliated with the Zionist movement. The commission listed its priorities of who would receive a British entry certificate. At the top of the list were professional Zionists. “Preference will be given to candidates over 35 years of age who worked not less than 10 years in the Zionist Organization...”


“The Commission proposes to limit the granting of recommendations for relatives as long as the thousands of recommendations in the offices of the Palestinian Amt have not been disposed of. In the future the confirmation of recommendations is to be so cut down that their number will correspond to the number of affirmed certificates of this category," the commission said.


But in the following years being a Zionist would mean little to receive a certificate to Palestine. Now, the Jewish Agency wanted to use the desperate situation for massive profit or simple blackmail.


In November 1938, Jewish Agency treasurer Eliezer Kaplan collected 500,000 pounds "in cash" in exchange for a promise to issue 400 certificates to the Jews of Czechoslovakia, now threatened by Hitler. The money arrived in Palestine but Kaplan encountered difficulty persuading British mandate authorities to issue the certificates.


In the fall of 1939, Eliyahu Dobkin, who directed the Jewish Agency’s immigration policy, called for virtually all entry certificates to be reserved for the wealthy. Dobkin, a Zionist leader in Poland in the 1920s, said the refugees would have to pay huge amounts of money to be rescued. They must agree to massive investments in the Yishuv. They would be forced to buy highly overpriced securities.


An ally of Jewish Agency chairman David Ben-Gurion, Dobkin would not accept credit. The Jews would first have to hand over their money; then the agency would work to obtain certificates. His recommendation was adopted.


The result was a sharp decline in immigration in 1940, a quarter of that of the previous year. The bidding war for certificates became policy within the Zionist leadership. The goal was to acquire the richest, smartest and strongest of immigrants. Nazi theories of race, known as eugenics, often served as a guide. They would be used by the Zionists to protect the Yishuv against Jews seen as harboring harmful traits.


To be considered for a Palestine entry certificate, one had to prove his worth to the Zionist leadership. A career with Zionist institutions, whether Histadrut, Palestine Office, Hashomer Hatzair, Hechalutz, or Women’s International Zionist Organization, could win the attention of the Jewish Agency bureaucracy. Proving one’s credentials as a major donor could score additional points.


The British, intent on using Hitler to stop the emergence of a Jewish state, worked closely with the Jewish Agency. By 1939, the British even restricted the prized A/1 category, granted to so-called capitalists and until then untouched by any quota.


Now, London decided to break up families eligible for A/1. Those with A/1 visas could no longer take their children over age 14 to Palestine. Weeks before the war, the Jewish Agency then added its own proviso. The desperate German Jews must first transfer their money to Palestine “before application can be considered.”


Regardless of the threat to the Jews, the Zionist leadership did little more than dangle the hope of rescue. In October 1938, as Germany rapidly expanded its hold, the Jewish Agency agreed to increase the number of certificates for Czechoslovakia from 17 to 40. In March of that year, when the Germans marched into Austria, there were 16 certificates available for that country. Months later, the number was increased to 60.


In all of Lithuania, largely abandoned by the Zionist community, there were 10 certificates available. In Mussolini’s Italy, there were no more than eight certificates for Jews desperately looking for another home. The largest number of certificates was reserved for the wealthy — except that under Hitler it was becoming increasingly difficult to find such Jews.


The Jewish Agency also decided to cancel certificates already issued and transfer them to those willing to pay more. In 1938, the parents of Mordechai Hacohen, stranded in Austria, were twice issued certificates from Tel Aviv. But the entry documents were intercepted by the Jewish Agency office in Vienna and given to its political supporters.


The value of an entry certificate became far greater once war erupted in Europe. Publicly, the Jewish Agency and Zionist leadership pledged to provide children with such entry documents. Instead, they were given to the rich or Zionist apparatchiks. The Jewish Agency priority placed its European staffers, known as “old Zionists,” at the top of the list. Next, were Zionist activists and rabbis. In last place came the children.


Sometimes, the British would demand certificates for their soldiers trapped in occupied Europe. The British also advised the Zionist leadership to hold on to certificates until they could be used for veteran Zionists, or “immigrants of better quality.”


In the end, few Jews were saved by an entry certificate. Rival Zionist movements fought over every certificate, usually sent from the Jewish Agency’s office in Geneva. By the time they were approved, many of the would-be recipients had died of illness or old age. In other cases, the German occupiers. directed by SS chief Heinrich Himmler, demanded money before select Zionists or prominent Jews could leave. The largest ransoms were for those in Poland.


Throughout, the British learned what they regarded as a valuable lesson regarding the Zionist leadership. British military intelligence concluded that the best way to pressure the ruling Mapai Party was through its wallet. Threaten their money, the assessment read, and the Zionists will do anything, including turn on their fellow Jews.


“The making of money is almost a second religion with the Jewish race," the intelligence report, dated March 1947, said.


Below: Dobkin, right, with his wife and Ben-Gurion in May 1947. [GPO]


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