The Big Meeting

By Steve Rodan

Once a week, the unofficial and unelected members of the Jewish community of Palestine convened. They were members of the Jewish Agency Executive, about 10 men who formally made decisions regarding economy, education, finance, immigration and sometimes passed resolutions that went far beyond the Land of Israel.

Some of the members made no secret of their complete fidelity to Britain. Other made a pretense for independence. The one who decided was the chairman of the executive -- David Ben-Gurion.

On March 26, the Jewish Agency leadership met for what was probably its most fateful session of World War II. A week earlier, Germany had invaded Hungary and began preparing for the Final Solution. The agency, which had formed a "rescue committee," was pressed by Zionists around the world to do something. There were thousands of Zionists trapped in Hungary, and many of the young guard clamored for help for resistance or rescue.

"In connection with the change of the situation in Hungary and the new tragedy expected to this large center of Judaism, we must use means to increase the number of [entry] certificates and save the maximum number of Zionists," Ben-Gurion said.

Virtually everybody agreed. Nobody on the executive had any illusions that the Germans would go to the trouble to occupy Hungary without trying to destroy the Jews. They knew that Hitler knew time was running out and that the orders were to exterminate the Jewish community within months.

London must approve

Ben-Gurion's opening statement reflected his loyalty to the British. Nothing should be done without London's approval, and that included smuggling Jews into Palestine. Throughout the war, Britain, citing the White Paper, allowed only a few thousand Jewish refugees. The Royal Navy had blocked boats full of Jews from reaching the shores of the Land of Israel. London had torpedoed numerous plans to provide a haven for the Jews anywhere in the world.

Still, the Zionist bureaucracy went through the motions. The Jewish Agency listed a total of 9,000 names for the live-saving certificate to Palestine. Many of those on the list were long assumed to be dead. For Hungary, the agency approved 2,100 names.

That counted for little with either the British mandate in Palestine or the Colonial Office in London. Their policy was never outright refusal. Instead, London simply cited security and other vetting procedures, a process that took months or even years. By then, there were no longer any Jews to save.

One executive member appeared to address this. He was Yitzhak Greenbaum, who often chaired meetings during Ben-Gurion's long jaunts abroad. Greenbaum was the head of the agency's rescue committee, characterized by bickering and inaction. He came from Poland, where he had been a member of the Senate. He used the podium to attack observant Jews, particularly their representative organization, Agudath Israel.

'Beyond despair'

"The situation in Hungary is beyond despair," Greenbaum said. "And all possible efforts are only through illegal ways."

Then, Greenbaum reverted to form: He dismissed any prospect of rescue or flight. The only way, he said, was to work with Hitler. He proposed negotiating with the Reich to stop the Final Solution. He called on the Zionists in the United States to lobby President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to talk to the fuhrer. Greenbaum also urged an approach to the Soviet Union in which Moscow would enable Jewish immigration to Palestine from areas captured by the Red Army.

Ben-Gurion, publicly a rival of Greenbaum but behind the scenes a close ally, dismissed the proposal. The man who had overseen a decade of relations with Hitler now said he was against talking to the Reich. Besides, the chairman added, the British would not disapprove.

'Have pity?'

Eliahu Dobkin agreed. Dobkin, another Polish Jew, said it would be shameful for the Zionists to deal with Hitler. Dobkin, who lobbied the executive to cooperate with rescue plans, predicted that any talks with Germany would result in concessions by the Zionists. He indicated that the concessions would include protecting the German killers after the war.

"Should we have pity on the Germans?" Dobkin asked.

Werner Senator was one of the most pro-British members of the executive. He opposed Ben-Gurion's rule, particularly his penchant for refusing to brief the executive and blocking its decisions. Senator, who ostensibly represented non-Zionists, was a veteran in the Zionist relationship with the Reich. Until the war, he had visited Berlin numerous times in talks with Berlin regarding Jewish expulsion and financial cooperation.

Senator knew what Greenbaum had in mind when the latter spoke of Zionist talks with Germany. He envisioned the German interlocutor as Franz von Papen, Germany's ambassador to Turkey, a former foreign minister who for years had been in contact with the Jewish Agency. Von Papen was regarded as a Nazi realist who believed that the Reich was doomed and must seek a separate peace with the West. No, Senator said, he would not support any meeting between a Jew and von Papen.

Proposals accepted

After everybody registered their objection, a most curious thing took place. The executive approved every point of Greenbaum's proposal. There was no vote recorded. The protocal simply stated, "The proposals were accepted." It was the first and only formal decision recorded of Jewish Agency negotiations with the Reich to save the Zionists -- at the expense of the Jewish masses.

What the agreement would mean was total cooperation between Hitler and the Jewish Agency. Zionists could be saved -- but only upon consent of the SS and Gestapo. Otherwise, the Zionist would be required to cooperate in the rapid deportation and extermination of Hungary's nearly one million Jews.

As Senator predicted, von Papen played a major role in Zionist negotiations with Berlin. He would help lay the groundwork for the Zionist leadership to lobby for a separate peace with the West. As Dobkin predicted, the Zionists would defend leading SS and other Nazis at Nuremberg. The leading SS member was Col. Kurt Becher, responsible for the looting of the Jews of Hungary before being sent to their death.

Why did the Jewish Agency Executive record this fateful meeting on March 26, 1944? This was the way every government or major organizations operated -- keep everything secret until a decision so damning must be made. At that point, present a consensus. It worked in Germany, Russia and the United States, and on March 26 in the meeting hall of the Jewish Agency.

Notes

The article is based on the Jewish Agency Executive meeting on March 26, 1944. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

Below: Several members of the Jewish Agency Executive. In the middle are David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok.